Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill: European Convention on Human Rights Memorandum by unknown
SMALL BUSINESS, ENTERPRISE AND EMPLOYMENT BILL 
 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
MEMORANDUM BY DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND 
SKILLS 
 
Introduction 
 
1. This memorandum addresses issues arising under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) in relation to the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Bill. The memorandum has been prepared by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, with input from the Treasury, HMRC, the 
Cabinet Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the 
Department for Education and UK Export Finance and the Insolvency Service. It 
has been amended to take account of the amendments made to the Bill in the first 
house (Commons).   
 
2. Baroness Neville-Rolfe DBE, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Business, Innovation and Skills and Minister for Intellectual Property has made a 
statement under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that, in her view, 
the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.  
 
3. This memorandum deals only with those provisions of the Bill which raise ECHR 
issues, and addresses the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as it applies to 
provisions of the Bill. 
 
4. Since the Bill deals with diverse subject areas, each measure which does or may 
engage a Convention right does so for its own individual reasons. Accordingly, 
the Memorandum addresses each relevant measure individually. The 
Memorandum is structured so as to follow the structure of the Bill. There is a 
section at the end which addresses the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
 
5. This version accompanies the Bill upon its introduction into the House of Lords, 
and has been amended since it was first published to take account of amendments 
made to the Bill during its passage through the House of Commons.  The changes 
made which are relevant to this memorandum are new provisions about the 
Payment Systems Regulator in Part 1 of the Bill, changes to the provisions for the 
Pubs Code Adjudicator and the Pubs Code in Part 4, and the extension of an 
information-sharing power for the purpose of assessing eligibility for free of 
charge early years provision in Part 5 of the Bill. 
 
Overview of the Bill 
 
6. The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill delivers a number of 
government priorities. 
 
7. Provisions in Part 1 aim to help business, and small businesses in particular, by 
making the payment practices of businesses more transparent, incentivising 
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improvements in payment culture, and helping small businesses agree fair 
payment terms.   
 
8. Further provisions which aim to help business include those to improve access to 
finance through increasing the availability of investment for small businesses, and 
the introduction of ‘Cheque Imaging’, giving the added option of depositing 
cheques remotely via Smartphone or tablet, thus enabling a faster clearing cycle.  
There are also provisions which amend legislation to expand the powers available 
to UK Export Finance to support UK exports and exporters. 
 
9. Part 2 deals with regulatory reform. Measures include requirements to make it 
easier for new companies to set up online, the establishment of a new office 
holder to scrutinise the processes for appeals and complaints against regulators to 
make them more effective for business, a requirement that regulations affecting 
business are reviewed frequently to remain effective, and require the government 
to publish a target for itself about the level of regulatory burdens in each 
parliamentary term, including transparent reporting on progress.  There is 
provision to amend landlord and tenant legislation to enable more home 
businesses. There is also a power for the Competition and Markets Authority to 
make recommendations about proposals for legislation and a new statutory 
definition of small and micro businesses for use in future secondary legislation in 
order to allow businesses of this size to be exempted from that legislation in some 
cases. 
 
10. Part 3 contains powers to streamline public procurement to remove barriers and 
help small business gain fair access to the £230bn public procurement market,  
Provisions also give additional powers to the Cabinet Office’s Mystery Shopper 
scheme to monitor public procurement practice. 
 
11. Part 4 contains provisions about the pubs industry.  These aim to bring fairness to 
the sole traders and small businesses that run 20,000 or so tied pubs 
across England and Wales, with a new Statutory Code and independent 
Adjudicator to ensure that publicans who are tied to a pub owning company are 
treated fairly. 
 
12. Part 5 contains measures which amend requirements for various aspects of 
registration required for the provision of childcare, and extends the existing 
exemption for schools from applying to Ofsted to provide care for children 
younger than school age to two year olds.  
 
13. Part 6 contains provision for the sharing of student information.  This will enable 
tracking of students through education into the labour market giving a fuller 
understanding of the impact of education choices on lifetime labour market 
outcomes. 
 
14. Part 7 contains measures which amend UK company law. These aim to increase 
transparency around who owns and controls UK companies and to deter and 
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sanction those who hide their interest in UK companies to facilitate illegal 
activities or who otherwise fall short of expected standards of behaviour. The 
measures include requiring every company to keep a register of people with 
significant control over the company, the abolition of share warrants and corporate 
directors and the imposition of directors' duties to shadow directors. 
 
15. Part 8 contains provisions that concern the filing requirements of companies. The 
measures amend requirements about the information which must be delivered to 
the registrar of companies in certain cases, providing a more flexible regime for 
companies in their dealings with the registrar. It also makes changes to improve 
the ability of the registrar to deal with situations where disputes as to the contents 
of the register arise. 
 
16. Part 9 amends the directors’ disqualification regime to strengthen the rules that 
prevent an individual from acting as a director where that individual has 
committed misconduct. The measures introduce new grounds for disqualification, 
create a new way in which creditors may receive financial redress for loss suffered 
through director misconduct, and update the matters that courts must take into 
account when considering a director disqualification. It also makes changes to 
increase the efficacy of the disqualification regime. 
 
17. Part 10 modernises and streamlines insolvency law to remove unnecessary costs 
and burdens to creditors and others. It also contains provisions that will ensure 
effective oversight of insolvency practitioners.  
 
18. In Part 11 of the Bill contains employment law provisions. These aim to deter 
employers from breaking National Minimum Wage legislation by allowing the 
maximum penalty for under payment to be calculated on a  per worker basis; to 
stop abuse of ‘exclusivity clauses’ in zero hours contracts, which stop individuals 
from working for another employer, even if the current employer is offering no 
work; reform the employment tribunal system to encourage more efficient 
management of postponements to reduce delay and cost; and introduce a penalty 
to ensure that awards are paid so that the majority of employers that do comply 
with the process are not put at disadvantage by those that avoid their 
responsibilities and liabilities. There are also provisions to cap exit payments for 
workers leaving the public sector 
 
ECHR issues in the Bill 
 
Part 1: Access to Finance 
Credit information (clauses 4, 5 and 6)  
 
19. Clauses 4 and 5 give the Treasury a power to make regulations (a) imposing 
obligations on certain designated banks to provide information about small 
businesses to certain designated credit reference agencies (“CRAs”) and online 
finance platforms and (b) imposing obligations for such credit reference agencies 
and online platforms to provide such information to finance providers. The 
underlying purpose is to tackle discrepancies in different finance providers’ access 
to the market for providing finance to small businesses, including access to 
information used to judge the creditworthiness of small businesses. 
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20. Information about the financial requirements and position of a business may 
include personal information (and is likely to do so where the business is run by a 
sole trader). As such, regulations made under clauses 4 and 5 are likely to engage 
and potentially interfere with Article 8(1) as they will provide for the sharing of 
personal data. 
 
21. The Government considers that any such interference would be justified under 
Article 8(2) as it is necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the 
country. This is because the sharing of information about small businesses (and of 
any personal information included therein) will enable new finance providers to 
offer finance to small businesses when they would not otherwise be aware of the 
opportunity to do so, and make lending decisions on the same basis as the larger 
banks which offer business current accounts. This will in turn: 
 
a. provide a level playing field in the market for providing finance to 
small businesses; 
b. increase competition in, and lower barriers to entry to, the sector for 
finance providers; and 
c. increase the range of providers from whom small businesses may be 
able to obtain finance. 
 
22. In addition, a requirement to share information on small businesses would be 
proportionate because: 
 
a. the requirement will only apply where the business has agreed to the 
sharing of the information, and information identifying a particular 
business will only be released to a finance provider by an online 
platform if the business has agreed to that particular finance provider 
receiving such information;  
b. any sharing of personal data will be subject to the restrictions in the 
Data Protection Act 1998, including the requirements that such data be 
processed fairly and lawfully, that it be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive, and that it be accurate and up to date; 
c. existing safeguards in the Data Protection Act 1998 and Consumer 
Credit Act 1974, relating to information held by CRAs will be 
extended to apply to all CRAs designated under this legislation; 
d. the opportunity to refer complaints to the Financial Ombudsman 
Service, which apply to CRAs and platforms authorised by the 
Financial Conduct Authority, will be extended to apply to all CRAs 
and platforms designated under this legislation; 
e. much of the information on creditworthiness of businesses is already 
shared lawfully between banks and CRAs, and in respect of that 
information the requirement will merely ensure that the information is 
made available to all finance providers equally. 
 
23. Clause 6(5) gives the Treasury a power to make regulations imposing obligations 
for designated CRAs to provide to the Bank of England the information provided 
by banks pursuant to regulations made under clause 4(1). The information may 
include personal information (and is likely to where the business is run by a sole 
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trader). As such, regulations made under clause 6(5) are likely to engage and 
potentially interfere with Article 8(1) as it allows the sharing of personal data. 
 
24. The Government considers that any such interference would be justified under 
Article 8(2) as it is necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the 
country. The sharing of this information will support the Bank of England’s 
assessments of credit conditions, inform monetary and macroprudential policy and 
support the work of the Treasury and the British Business Bank by allowing a 
much deeper understanding of the small business market. For example, it would 
provide a much fuller understanding of the regional and sectoral allocation of 
credit, of what type of small businesses are being granted credit, and the risk 
profiles of different types of small businesses. 
 
25. In addition, any requirement to share information on small businesses would be 
proportionate because: 
 
a. the requirement would only apply where the business has originally 
agreed to the information being shared with CRAs by a bank;  
b. clause 6(5) requires that the regulations must include provision 
protecting the confidentiality of the information provided; 
c. any sharing of personal data would be subject to the restrictions in the 
Data Protection Act 1998, including the requirements that such data be 
processed fairly and lawfully, that it be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive, and that it be accurate and up to date. 
 
 
Exports: Powers for the Secretary of State under section 1 of the Export and 
Investments Guarantees Act 1991 commitment limits under that Act (clauses 11 
and 12) 
 
26. Clauses 11 and 12 amend the existing provisions in the Export and Investment 
Guarantees Act 1991 (“EIGA”), under which the Secretary of State has powers to 
provide support for UK exports.  These powers are exercised by the Export 
Credits Guarantee Department, which currently operates under the name of UK 
Export Finance.  
 
27. Clause 11 broadens the support that the Secretary of State, acting through UK 
Export Finance, can provide to UK exports and exporters. 
 
28. Clause 11 amends the financial limits which apply to the Secretary of State’s 
ability to incur liabilities in supporting exports and overseas investments and in 
managing UK Export Finance’s portfolio of liabilities. 
 
29. These amendments do not engage Convention rights. However, there are more 
general arguments advanced by some NGOs in relation to the general exercise by 
UK Export Finance of its functions under the EIGA.  
 
30. These arguments are around human rights in the general sense rather than 
Convention rights.  They arise because UK Export Finance from time to time 
supports supplies of goods and services to overseas projects, the performance of 
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which may involve human rights issues for example, the acquisition of land from 
local residents.  
 
31. UK Export Finance follows the OECD Recommendation on Common Approaches 
to Environmental, Social and Human Rights Due Diligence on Officially 
Supported Export Credits (known as the “Common Approaches”) which governs 
the activities of OECD export credit agencies when supporting projects.  This 
approach is consistent with government policy on advancing human rights. 
 
32. The Common Approaches requires export credit agencies, when considering 
applications for support for certain projects, to classify those projects according to 
their environmental, social and human rights impacts and to require that 
international standards for mitigating unacceptable negative impacts should be 
adhered to when performing the relevant project.   
 
Payment Systems Regulator – amendment of power of Payment Systems 
Regulator to require disposal of interests in payment systems (clause 14(2)) 
 
33. Clause 14(2) amends section 58 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013. That section confers on the Payment Systems Regulator (which is 
established pursuant to section 40 of that Act) a power to require a person who has 
an interest in the operator of a regulated payment system to dispose of all or part 
of that interest. Regulated payment systems are those designated under section 43 
of the 2013 Act, subject to the criteria in section 44. 
 
34. Similar competition issues may arise in relation to ownership of providers of 
infrastructure to payment systems as in relation to ownership of operators of 
payment systems. Therefore, clause 14(2) extends the existing power in section 58 
such that it may also be exercised in relation to an interest in such an 
infrastructure provider.  
 
35. Exercise of the existing power in section 58 would engage Article 1 of Protocol 1 
to the Convention (“A1P1”) since it interferes with the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions. Exercise of the power as amended by the Bill would engage A1P1 in 
the same way. 
 
36. However, the right is a qualified right, and the Government considers that such 
interference may be justified as proportionate and necessary in the public interest 
to resolve or prevent a competition problem caused by concentration of ownership 
interests, particularly considering the wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
states in this area (on which point see for example JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United 
Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45). 
 
37. The Government takes this view in particular because— 
 
a. the power may be exercised only where the Payment Systems 
Regulator is satisfied that, if the power is not exercised, there is likely 
to be a distortion of competition; 
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b. the power enables a requirement for ownership interests to be disposed 
of, without enabling confiscation or a requirement to transfer an 
interest to any particular person; and 
 
c. the exercise of the power is subject to a right of appeal to the 
Competition and Markets Authority under section 76 of the 2013 Act, 
and the appeal may relate to the merits of the decision. 
 
 
Part 2: Regulatory Reform 
 
Exemption from liability for bodies concerned with accounting standards (clause 
37) 
38. Clause 37 repeals section 18 of the Companies (Audit, Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) and inserts new section 18A into 
that Act.  
 
39. Section 18 provides that where the Secretary of State has paid a grant to a 
body carrying on activities concerned with any of the matters set out at section 16(2) 
of the 2004 Act, that body (and its members, officers and staff) will not be liable in 
damages as regards certain of that body’s acts or omissions occurring in the 12-month 
period beginning on the day the grant was paid. Those acts and omissions are things 
done or omitted to be done for the purposes of, or in connection with, the carrying on 
(or the purported carrying on) of activities concerned with any of the matters set out 
in section 16(2).   
 
40. Section 18 nonetheless provides for exceptions to this exemption from 
liability. The exemption does not apply if the act or omission is shown to have been in 
bad faith or if the act or omission was unlawful pursuant to section 6(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 i.e. was an act (or omission) of a “public authority” incompatible 
with rights under the ECHR. Section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act provides, inter 
alia, that “public authority” includes “any person certain of whose functions are 
functions of a public nature”. The matters set out at section 16(2) are “functions of a 
public nature”.  
 
41. The matters set out at section 16(2) are various matters relating to financial 
reporting and the regulation of accountancy, audit and actuarial services.  
 
42.  New section 18A is similar to section 18. Instead of an exemption from 
liability on the face of the legislation, however, it provides that the Secretary of State 
may by order or by regulations exempt specified individuals or bodies from liability 
in damages.  As with section 18, new section 18A provides that any such exemption 
conferred by an order or regulations will not apply if the thing done or not done was 
in bad faith or was unlawful under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 
 
43. An exercise of the power in favour of a certain body could deprive someone of 
their right to recover damages in respect of certain acts and omissions of the body, 
and therefore could theoretically engage Article 6(1).  However, in practice, the 
clause will prevent the right to damages arising in the first place, as opposed to 
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interfering with the pursuance of an existing right, and so Article 6, which confers 
procedural guarantees as regards legal rights, is not applicable.  
 
44. Arguably the clause also raises Article 1, Protocol 1 issues. An exercise of the 
power could deprive a person of an award of damages. For the same reasons advanced 
above, the clause would prevent a right to recover damages from arising in the first 
place. The Government does not therefore consider that Article 1 of the First Protocol 
is engaged.  
 
Part 4: The Pubs Code Adjudicator and the Pubs Code 
Summary of clauses 40 to 70 
The Statutory Code 
45. The Secretary of State must, under Clause 41 make regulations about practices 
to be followed by pub-owning business in their dealings with their tied tenants, 
referred to in the Bill as the Pubs Code.  The purpose of the Code is to provide all tied 
tenants of Pub owning businesses with 500 or more tied pubs with increased 
transparency, fair treatment, the right to request a rent review when tied product 
prices increase significantly and the right to take disputes to an independent 
Adjudicator.  The Code will additionally require these pub owning businesses to offer 
parallel free-of-tie rent assessments to potential or existing tenants. This will 
strengthen the negotiating position of the tenant and help ensure pub-owning 
businesses are offering a fair share of risk and reward in their tied agreements. 
 
46. Clause 42 of the Bill introduces a duty on the Secretary of State to include 
within the Pubs Code a market rent only option for pub owning businesses with 501 
pubs of which at least one is tenanted.  Where they are a brewery the provision 
enables such a pub owning business to continue to require that specified brands 
produced by the brewery are sold within its tied pubs. The clause sets out various 
circumstances in which the Pubs Code shall require the offer of the Market Rent only 
option including when the tenancy is renewed and when the pub owning business 
gives notices of a significant increase in the price it supplies products to a tenant. If no 
settlement is reached within 21 days on a mutually agreeable market rent, then an 
independent assessor, who is independent of both parties and competent by virtue of 
qualification and/or experience may be appointed to assess the market rent for the 
property as a pub with no tie and the pub tenant will no longer be subject to any 
alcohol tie. This duty on the Secretary of State will be implemented by Regulations 
under the negative resolution procedure. 
 
47. The Bill provides at clause 44 for an affirmative regulation power which can 
make provision about the effect of a contractual term in a tenancy between a pub-
owning business and a tied pub tenant which is inconsistent with provisions in the 
Code. The regulation makes provision for such a term to be void or unenforceable in 
both existing tenancies and tenancies entered into after commencement.   
 
Establishment of the Adjudicator 
48.  A new independent Adjudicator will enforce the provisions of the Code with 
powers to arbitrate disputes, investigate systemic breaches and provide guidance on 
interpretation of the Code. The Government also intends that the Adjudicator will 
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have the power to impose sanctions – including financial penalties – if it finds that the 
Code has been breached.  
 
Arbitration (clauses 45 to 49) 
49. Clause 45 provides that a tied pub tenant may refer a dispute to the 
Adjudicator for arbitration on the question of whether a pub-owning business has 
breached the Code. 
 
50. Clause 47 provides for circumstances in which the pub-owning business refers 
to arbitration under a contractual arbitration provision.  
 
51. Clause 48 sets out the requirements in terms of fees paid by a tied pub tenant 
for referral for arbitration and makes provisions for the costs of the arbitrator and the 
costs of the arbitration. 
 
52. Clause 44 sets out that any term of an agreement (entered into before or after 
commencement) between a pub-owning business and a tied pub tenant is void to the 
extent that it prevents a tenant from referring a dispute to the Adjudicator in 
accordance with clause 45. It also specifies that a term in any such agreement which is 
inconsistent with clauses 47 and 48 or regulations made under clause 48 is 
unenforceable. 
 
Investigations (clauses 50 to 56) 
53.  Clauses 50 to 56 enable the Adjudicator to carry out an investigation if there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect that a pub-owning business has breached the Code 
or failed to follow a recommendation made by the Adjudicator following an earlier 
investigation. Following an investigation, the Adjudicator must publish a report and, 
if satisfied that a pub-owning business has breached the Code, consider whether to 
exercise any of the following enforcement powers:  
 
• to make (non-binding) recommendations to the pub-owning business; 
• to require the pub-owning business to publish information about the 
investigation; 
• to impose a financial penalty on the pub-owning business.  
Levy (clause 60) 
54. The Adjudicator may, under clause 60, require pub-owning businesses to pay 
a levy towards the Adjudicator’s expenses.   
 
ECHR issues 
The power by the Secretary of State to issue a statutory Code – “the Pubs Code”  
55. The Code will apply to pub-owning businesses with 500 or more tied pubs 
save for those exempted under the power to exempt. It broadly replicates the current 
industry Code currently signed up to by the majority of pub-owning businesses. The 
costs of compliance with the provisions of the Code are broadly the same as 
complying with the current voluntary industry code with the exception of the sign off 
of rent assessments by a RICS qualified valuer.  These costs are low. In so far as the 
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assessment by RICS qualified valuer some pub owning business already adopt this 
practice. For those who do not already employ the services of a RICS valuer the cost 
would involve getting their valuer RICS qualified (which takes 6 months and is in the 
region of £350 and then an annual fee of £100).  The Government does not consider 
that the imposition of the majority of the Code’s provisions engage Article 1 Protocol 
1 because they are the same as the existing voluntary code and the costs of 
compliance are low. 
 
56.  The majority of the Code’s provisions would not impose disproportionate costs: The 
cost of complying with the provisions of the Code will be broadly the same as 
complying with the current voluntary Code which is £40 per pub. The Government 
estimates the cost to the pub owning business of the Adjudicator will be £125 per pub. 
The statutory measures do not impose disproportionate cost. If pub owning businesses 
do not currently employ an experienced valuer to confirm that RICS guidance is being 
adhered to, there would be a cost to employ such a person which would engage 
Article 1 Protocol 1. This cost would be offset against the cost of a valuer currently 
employed and would be proportionate in light of the need for assessments to be in line 
with industry guidance and assessed by a suitably qualified person. In order for the 
policy underpinning the legislation to be delivered it is necessary for rent assessments 
to be accurate and in accordance with industry guidelines. In addition the cost of 
complying with these provisions are focused on those companies about which the 
Government has received the most evidence of abuse of the tie/ complaints. 
 
57. The Government is of the view that the cost of complying with the Parallel 
Rent Assessment (PRA) requirement and the Market Rent only Option under the 
Code both engage Article 1 Protocol 1, although they are compatible with the right. 
To the extent that A1P1 is engaged, we consider that this is justified in the interest of 
ensuring a fair share of risk and reward between parties. 
 
58.  The imposition of the PRA requirement on pub-owning businesses with 500 
or more tied pubs will increase the cost of compliance in circumstances where a PRA 
is requested.  PRA is necessary to address the imbalance in bargaining power between 
the tenant and pub-owning business and ensure a fair share of risk and reward. The 
PRA enables the tenant to determine whether they are no worse off in a tied 
agreement and use the assessment to negotiate a better deal. The Government intends 
that the PRA will provide the tenant with the benefit of a point of comparison and 
better information, to address the imbalance in bargaining power between tenants and 
pub-owning businesses. 
 
59. Again the costs of complying with the PRA provisions of the Code are 
focused on those companies about which the Government has received the most 
evidence of abuse of the tied model/ complaints. A PRA cannot be requested unless 
negotiations have failed – thus mitigating the cost for pub-owning businesses. The 
Government estimates that the total cost to pub-owning businesses of producing 
PRAs will be approximately £2.5m per annum. 
 
60. The imposition of the Market Rent Only (MRO) option on pub owning 
businesses with 501 or more pubs of which one is a tied pub will increase the cost of 
compliance with the Code and will engage A1P1. With PRA the benefit is greater 
transparency over the value of the tie and may lead to an adjustment of the tied rent. 
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The difference is that the PRA will lead to an improved tied offer whereas with MRO 
the landlord is obligated to make a free of tie offer. It is considered that the Market 
Rent only option is necessary to address the imbalance in risk and reward between 
pub owning business and tied tenant. If the tied model is proved to deliver significant 
benefits to the lessee, then the MRO option would not be taken up, and the tied model 
would remain. There is a wealth of evidence from BIS Select Committees that there 
are too many cases of tenants unable to secure a fair share of risk and reward in their 
agreement and that over a period of time offering lessees the option of being tied or 
being free of the tie is the only way to judge properly the fairness of the tie. The MRO 
option addresses the incentives that get to the heart of how the tied model ensures tied 
tenants are no worse off than Free of tie tenants. There are arguments that pub 
closures could be increased under MRO and there would be additional costs in the 
compliance with the MRO requirements of approximately £4200. These costs would 
be shared between pub owning business and tied pub tenant. Some of these costs may 
be avoidable because the threat of MRO will provide greater incentives to provide a 
fairer tie agreement and to settle disputes earlier which would lead to an avoidance or 
decrease in costs.   In light of the above the measure is proportionate to ensure 
fairness of the tie. 
61.   The new MRO introduces the right to MRO in a staged fashion.  The right 
will be made available to tenants when their next rent review or tenancy renewal is 
due. It will only be triggered before then if the pub is sold or other extraordinary 
circumstances occur. 
 
62.   Subject to further deliberation by Ministers it is intended that the PRA and 
MRO would be mutually exclusive therefore there is minimal extra costs from the 
introduction of the MRO. 
 
63. The Government considers that the additional costs of the PRA, MRO and the 
interference with ordinary commercial practices are proportionate and strike a fair 
balance between the general interest and the protection of the pub-owning businesses’ 
property. In particular we have had regard to the rights of pub tenants – both in 
respect of their business and (for many) their homes (as pub tenants often live in the 
pubs that they run). 
 
64. The Government considers that the interference with ordinary commercial 
practices and the effect on leases in terms of voiding tenancy terms which are 
inconsistent with the Statutory Code are proportionate and strike a fair balance 
between the general interest and the protection of the pub-owning businesses’ 
property. In the case of this provision, the Code is not designed to expropriate 
property from pub-owning businesses but to introduce rules to encourage fairer 
dealing between them and their tenants.  
 
65.  The degree of unfairness that may be suffered by pub owning companies in 
relation to the voiding of tenancy terms is substantially mitigated by the fact that there 
has been lengthy discussion over ten years about the pubs industry and the 
relationship between pub owning companies and tied tenants. In light of this, pub 
owning businesses have been on notice for a number of years that action by 
Government was a possibility. When consulting in 2013 the Government gave notice 
that the Code would apply to all agreements including existing agreements. 
 
 11 
66. In considering the degree of unfairness, the voiding of terms of the tenancy 
which are inconsistent with the Statutory Code, it is significant that the precise terms 
of the Code are to be consulted on publicly, so pub owning businesses will be able to 
make representations to Government. In addition the Code is subject to the 
affirmative procedure in Parliament which will provide further consideration of 
compatibility with the ECHR. 
 
67. Any unfairness arising from the voiding of tenancy terms is outweighed by the 
competing public interest. In order to achieve the policy intent of fairness and tied 
tenants are not disadvantaged, it is necessary for the Code to apply to all tenancy 
agreements, whenever they are made. There is no alternative to this, if all tied tenants 
are to be provided with the protections of the Code. 
 
68. The Code provisions should be considered as the imposition of controls on the 
exercise of property rights. The controls are in part procedural rules which increase 
transparency for tenants in their negotiations and puts them into a better position to 
conduct those negotiations. This is necessary in the light of the evidence gathered 
about the inability of tenants to secure a fair deal in negotiations over their tied 
tenancies.   
 
69. These controls regulate economic relations. Pub-owning businesses will still 
be able to arrange their businesses on a tied-pub model and will be able to raise rent 
on their property. The state’s interference is aimed at putting both parties on an equal 
footing in commercial negotiations. The controls are therefore proportionate in 
meeting the public interest in preserving the economic well-being of the nation. 
 
70. To the extent that there is any deprivation or interference of property rights, 
we rely on the following case law. National authorities have a wide margin of 
appreciation in assessing the existence of a problem of public concern and the 
remedial action to be taken. In James v United Kingdom (1986) EHRR 123 the 
ECtHR held that, in addition: 
 
“the notion of ‘public interest’ is necessarily extensive… the decision to enact laws 
expropriating property will commonly involve consideration of political, economic 
and social issues on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably 
differ widely.  The Court… will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the 
public interest’ unless that judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation…”1   
71.  This was followed by Mellacher v Austria (1989) 12 EHRR 391 where the 
court concluded that “in remedial social legislation and in particular in the field of 
rent control, it must be open to the legislature to take measures affecting the further 
execution of previously concluded contracts in order to attain the aim of the policy 
developed”. 
 
72. In conclusion, the deprivation or interference of the property rights of pub-
owning businesses is justified and proportionate. Furthermore, there will be 
consideration of compatibility with ECHR rights when the Code (both Core and 
Enhanced provisions) is implemented through secondary legislation.  
 
1 At paragraph 46 
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The Pubs Adjudicator 
73. The Pubs Code Adjudicator and the power to arbitrate and investigate 
breaches of the Code are modelled on the Groceries Code Adjudicator set up under 
the Groceries Code Adjudicator Act 2013. The Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill 2013 
was considered by Ministers as being human rights compliant and successfully passed 
through Parliament. The Pubs Code Adjudicator raises the same issues and therefore 
does not raise issues of concern. We do not propose to rehearse the same arguments 
here. 
 
Arbitration  
74. The issues of statutory arbitration, independence and impartiality of the 
Adjudicator, equality of arms in arbitration, public hearings and pronouncement of 
judgements, information about arbitration and its interaction with Articles 6 and 8 
were considered to be human rights compliant under the Groceries Code Adjudicator 
Bill and similarly raise no concerns here.. 
 
75. The interference in so far as the effect of voiding tenancy terms on costs (in 
existing tenancies or future tenancies) which are inconsistent with provisions on 
arbitration in the Act are proportionate and strike a fair balance between the general 
interest and the protection of the pub-owning businesses’ property. Where a pub- 
owning business refers for arbitration under contractual arbitration agreements, any 
contractual terms relating to who should bear the costs of the arbitration are void to 
the extent that they are inconsistent with provisions on costs set out in the Act. This 
may mean that the pub-owning business bears more of their own costs of the 
arbitration process than they would have done under the contractual arbitration clause 
(although it is possible for the Adjudicator to require the tenants to pay costs over the 
cap in certain circumstances) or that the Adjudicator seeks to recoup any unrecovered 
costs via the levy at clause 54. As against this, tied tenants will now have access to a 
low cost, transparent arbitration service. In the past tied tenants often did not refer to 
arbitration because there was a potential for them to face significant costs. Tied 
tenants were therefore more likely simply to agree to terms set by the pub-owning 
businesses, who were in a better negotiating position. This had the effect of limiting 
the tenants’ bargaining position and potentially reducing their ability to run a 
profitable pub.  
 
76.   The policy would be undermined if tenancy terms which are inconsistent with 
the arbitration provisions were not unenforceable as the arbitration provisions of the 
Bill could apply only in relation to new tenancy agreements and pub tenancies can be 
up to 20 years in duration. The effect of the clauses making arbitration provisions 
within existing agreements unenforceable is not to remove arbitration rights from 
either tenants or landlords completely but to give precedence to the new statutory 
rights the Bill which will create an even playing field across the sector.  
 
77. The statutory Adjudicator model provides the tied tenant with a low cost, 
independent and transparent arbitration service. Tied tenants are less likely to accept 
disadvantageous terms and more likely to refer to arbitration. Pub tenants are in a 
significantly weaker financial position than the pub-owning businesses (many earn as 
little as £15,000 per annum) and the prejudice to tied tenants of not having access to 
this low cost independent Adjudication model far outweighs the prejudice to pub-
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owning businesses who may face costs higher than those in their contractual 
arbitration terms. 
 
Investigation powers 
78. Article 8, Article 6 and Article 1 Protocol 1 were considered in relation to the 
Groceries Code Adjudicator’s investigation and enforcement powers. The 
Adjudicator’s investigation and enforcement powers were considered and deemed to 
be human rights compliant under the Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill 2013.   
 
79.  The Adjudicator’s power to make recommendations, the requirement to 
publish, the ability to impose financial penalties and the ability to require payment of 
costs were considered to be human rights compliant under the Groceries Code 
Adjudicator Bill 2013. 
 
Levy funding  
80. The fact that the Adjudicator is funded primarily by levy was considered to be 
human rights compliant in relation to the Groceries Code Adjudicator and the same 
principles apply to the Pubs Adjudicator. 
 
Part 5: Childcare and schools 
 
Assessing eligibility for free of charge early years provision (clause 71) 
 
81. Clause 71 amends sections 13A and 13B in the Childcare Act 2006 (“CA”). 
Section 13A currently gives the Secretary of State (in practice, the Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions) and the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs the power to supply information that they hold in relation to social security 
and tax credits functions to the Secretary of State (in practice, the Secretary of State 
for Education) and to local authorities to use for the purposes of determining 
eligibility for free early years provision (as defined in regulations under Section 7 of 
the CA).  The information supplied pursuant to these powers is used to populate an 
electronic system, which local authorities can use to check that a particular child is 
eligible.  
 
82. The Government now wishes to make available a new strand of funding for 
the most disadvantaged 3-4 year olds in receipt of free early years provision. Clause 
71 of the Bill seeks to make use of the existing information gateway under section 
13A for the purpose of assessing eligibility for this new strand of funding. This has 
been achieved by amending subsection 13A(3) to extend the purposes for which data 
specified at subsections 13A(1) and (2) can be used by the Secretary of State and local 
authorities to include funding for free early years provision. The clause also amends 
subsection 13A(6) to allow information to be supplied to persons exercising functions 
on behalf of local authorities for the specified new purpose. 
 
83. Section 13B currently provides that a person commits an offence where he 
discloses information received from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) or 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) under section 13A, except if the 
disclosure takes place in one of the circumstances listed in subsection 13B(2).   
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84. Clause 71 amends section 13B by extending the grounds for lawful disclosure 
under section 13B(2) to include the disclosure in connection with exercising functions 
relating to determining eligibility for funding for free early years provision. This 
amendment is necessary to ensure that individuals using information for the new 
purpose in section 13A(3) of the CA are not committing an offence.  
 
85. The sharing of information about individuals by DWP or HMRC, or onward 
supply of information to local authorities, would engage Article 8(1) of the ECHR.  
The information would be personal details and information relating to the receipt of 
tax credits and social security benefits.   
 
86. However, an interference with Article 8(1) can be justified in accordance with 
Article 8(2).  We consider that any interference in this case will be necessary in a 
democratic society for the purposes of the economic well-being of the country, since 
the purpose behind the sharing of information is to ensure that local authorities are 
easily able to establish whether a child is eligible for funding for free early years 
provision, and thereby reduce fraudulent claims or mistakes as to eligibility.   
 
87. The measure is proportionate, as section 13A makes clear that the information 
can only be shared and used for the specified purposes and no other purposes. In 
addition, there is a safeguard built in because any unauthorised use or disclosure will 
be deterred, or otherwise dealt with, under section 13B.   
 
88. All parties will be data controllers or data processors and therefore also subject 
to the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 including the requirements that 
such data be processed fairly and lawfully, that it be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive, and that it be accurate and up to date. This will also help to ensure 
compliance with Article 8(1).  We therefore consider that the amendments to section 
13A and 13B do not breach Article 8. 
 
Part 6: Education Evaluation 
 
Education Evaluation (clauses 75 to 77) 
 
89. Clause 75 enables the sharing of information between Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (“HMRC”), the Secretary of State and a devolved authority for the 
purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of education or training provision and 
assessing policy in relation to such provision. The clause extends an existing power 
for HMRC to disclose tax information for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness 
of education or training and assessing related policy for persons in further education 
who have attained the age of 19. The clause also enables the Secretary of State and a 
devolved authority to share personal data with HMRC for the same purpose 
 
90. This clause engages and potentially interferes with Article 8(1).  This is 
because it extends the scope of current data sharing powers held by HMRC, the 
Secretary of State and a devolved authority in relation to persons in higher education 
and training or education provided for persons under 19 (rather than in relation to 
persons in further education only and who have attained the age of 19).  
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91.  However, the Government considers that any such interference would be 
justified under Article 8(2) as it is necessary in the interests of the economic well-
being of the country. This is because the data sharing power will enable the Secretary 
of State and a devolved authority to: 
 
• significantly improve knowledge and information on pathways through 
learning and outcomes. 
• improve upon information, advice and guidance available on learning 
outcomes to assist public decision making on educational choices. 
• improve upon the ability of these organisations to carry out their 
functions. 
92. In addition, the sharing is proportionate because: 
 
• any sharing of personal data will be subject to the restrictions in the Data 
Protection Act 1998 that apply to personal data, including the requirements 
that such data be processed fairly and lawfully, that it be adequate, relevant 
and not excessive, and that it be accurate and up to date; 
• some but not all of the data may already be held by each of the 
organisations, which will serve to limit the amount of new data to be 
shared under this clause; and 
• information disclosed in reliance on these data sharing powers may only 
be used in connection with specified functions of the Secretary of State or 
a devolved authority (relating to the assessment of education or training 
provision) and, so far as is reasonably practicable, must not be used in 
such a way that the identity of an individual is disclosed to a person 
carrying out one of those functions. 
93. Clause 76 enables a person to share student information with the Secretary of 
State, Welsh Ministers, an information collator, a prescribed person or a person 
falling within a prescribed category.  
 
94. The clause further enables the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to make 
regulations which define the circumstances in which student information may be 
shared, the description of such student information and the persons with whom the 
information may be disclosed to other than the Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers 
and an information collator. In this way, the regulations will serve to limit the scope 
of data sharing between different private providers of qualifications.  
 
95. This clause closely resembles existing data sharing powers held in relation to 
schools. It engages and potentially interferes with Article 8(1) as it allows the sharing 
of personal data. The Government considers that any such interference would be 
justified under Article 8(2) as it is necessary in the interests of the economic well-
being of the country. This is because the collection of such personal data will enable 
the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to:  
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• form a more complete picture of the attainment data for qualifications 
accredited by Ofqual, irrespective of where the learning was undertaken 
or the age of a student and thereby gain a more “joined-up” view of 
individuals’ progression through education; and 
 
• more effectively measure progress towards Departmental Key 
Performance Indicators and quality assure performance data published 
about assessment centres 
 
96. This will, in turn, enable the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to make 
better use of their resources, inform policy development and help to identify 
barriers to student progression. 
97. In addition, the measure is proportionate because: 
 
• any sharing of personal data will be subject to the restrictions in the Data 
Protection Act 1998 that apply to personal data, as set out in relation to 
clause 75 above; 
• some of the student information may already be held by the Secretary of 
State and Welsh Ministers , which will serve to limit the amount of new 
data to be shared under this clause; and   
• the receiver of any student information will not be able to publish it in any 
form which identifies the individual to whom it relates.   
98. Clause 77 enables the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to share 
information relating to a former student, including details of that person’s next 
destination, with their further education institution. This clause makes similar 
provision to existing data sharing powers that the Secretary of State has in relation to 
schools and thus widens such powers, so that they cover not just schools but further 
education institutions too.  
 
99. This clause engages and potentially interferes with Article 8(1) as it allows the 
sharing of personal data. However, the Government considers that any such 
interference would be justified under Article 8(2) as it is necessary in the interests of 
the economic well-being of the country. This is because the data sharing power will 
enable further education institutions to: 
 
• have confidence in the robustness of the Department’s aggregate 
destinations data; 
• support their own self-evaluation and self-improvement; and 
• make more informed decisions about their choice of curriculum and 
qualifications, and assess the effectiveness of their support to students. 
100. In addition, the measure is proportionate because any sharing of personal data 
will be subject to the restrictions in the Data Protection Act 1998 that apply to 
personal data, as set out in relation to clause 75 above; and some of the data may 
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already be held by further education institutions, which will serve to limit the amount 
of new data to be shared under this clause. Furthermore, the clause enables the 
Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to make regulations which define the term 
“activities”, and thereby set parameters for the disclosure of information about a 
former student’s activities either by setting a time bar, beyond which point details of 
such activities cannot be shared back with the former student’s further education 
institution, or by limiting the types of activity which fall within the definition of 
“destination information”. 
 
Part 7: Companies: Trust and Transparency 
 
Register of people with significant control (clause 78 and Schedule 3) 
 
101. This clause introduces a new Part into the Companies Act 2006 that requires 
companies to identify and obtain information on people with significant control over 
the company (“PSCs”).  
 
Article 8 
 
102. This new clause requires an individual who is a PSC or who has knowledge of 
a PSC to notify companies of certain particulars, including the PSC’s name, service 
and residential address(es), country of usual residence, nationality, date of birth and 
details regarding the control the individual exerts over the company. This information 
must be kept on a register by the company and made available for inspection. 
 
103. To the extent that this policy interferes with the right to a private life, the 
Government considers the requirements of the register to be justifiable under Article 
8(2) ECHR, and necessary in a democratic society both in the interests of the 
economic well-being of the country and for the prevention of crime. The PSC register 
is necessary as a means of helping law enforcement and tax authorities identify and 
sanction those who ultimately control companies that are used for criminal purposes, 
as well as potentially deterring the criminal misuse of UK companies. There is also a 
wider economic benefit in increasing the transparency surrounding business 
ownership and control.  This is linked to reducing the risks around economic activity 
and increasing trust by reducing information asymmetry between those that trade 
with, or invest in, the company and those that control it.  
 
104. The Government also considers the measure to be proportionate to the aims. 
There are safeguards in place where the release of this information would be harmful 
to the individual: provision is made for a protection regime to prevent personal 
information being publicly available where the individual might be at risk.  Further, 
certain information regarding the PSC will never be available publicly and will 
instead be available only to law enforcement bodies and other specified authorities at 
the discretion of the registrar of companies. Regulations will set out under what 
circumstances the registrar may release such information to the specific authorities, 
who must treat the information in accordance with Article 8 ECHR and the Data 
Protection Act 
 
Article 1 Protocol 1 
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105.  Clause 78 creates a procedure enabling a company to restrict certain interests 
in that company belonging to individuals or legal entities where a person fails to 
respond to a notice by the company, thus controlling the individual’s use of the 
property. These interests include the enjoyment or exercise of rights attached to 
shares, for example to receive a dividend or to vote in shareholder meetings, or to 
exercise other rights such as the right to appoint directors of the company. Where a 
company imposes restrictions on the interests, a person will not be able to enjoy the 
benefit, exercise, transfer or otherwise make use of the interest.  
 
106. This procedure engages Article 1 Protocol 1. However this is a qualified right 
and the Government considers this procedure to be proportionate and necessary in the 
public interest for the legitimate purpose of effectively enforcing the law requiring a 
PSC register, which register as discussed above is necessary for the economic well-
being of the country and the prevention of crime. 
 
107. The Government considers this particular enforcement mechanism necessary 
and proportionate since, where a person wishes to hide their identity in relation to an 
interest in a company, they may not respond to a notice from the company. While 
failure to respond to a notice is a criminal offence,  there is concern that people served 
notice outside of the UK in particular will not be incentivised to respond to the notice 
by the threat of a criminal offence alone. However if restrictions are placed on the 
interest of the person so that a person cannot enjoy their interest in the company 
without responding to the notice, this will incentivise either a response, or an 
abandoning of the interest.  
 
108. As to parties who have complied with the Part but who hold interests jointly so 
are affected by restrictions, a company is required to have regard to these third party 
rights when considering whether to subject the interest to restrictions. However, on 
application by an aggrieved party, a court may order the removal or relaxation of 
restrictions where the restrictions unfairly affect the rights of the party. These 
provisions safeguard the rights of third parties sufficiently to prevent disproportionate 
infringement of Article 1, Protocol 1 rights. 
 
Article 6 
 
109. Clause 78 could also be argued to engage Article 6, as it enables a company to 
restrict the rights of an individual, effectively allowing a company to determine a 
person’s civil rights. “Civil rights” are those civil rights in private law2 between two 
private persons and includes rights as to property.  
 
110. In order to maintain the freedom guaranteed by Article 6(1) to a fair hearing in 
the determination of the legal rights provided for by law, the clause makes provision 
for an individual to apply to the court for an order overturning or relaxing the 
restrictions. The Government considers this route of appeal sufficient to guard the 
Article 6 rights of a person affected by the restrictions placed on interests by a 
company. Any aggrieved party may apply to the court and the court may re-examine 
the facts of the individual case, including the initial decision to impose restrictions. 
2 Ringeisen v Austria A 13 (1971) 
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The court has a wide discretion to make any order that it sees fit. The appeal process 
is therefore Article 6 compliant and so Article 6 rights are respected. 
 
Abolition of share warrants to bearer (clause 81 and Schedule 4) 
 
111. Clause 81 provides that no share warrant may be issued after the coming into 
force of this provision.  
 
112. A share warrant, otherwise known as a bearer share, is a special type of share 
where the owner of the share is not registered on the register of members but legal 
ownership is determined by physically holding the warrant. Title to the shares referred 
to in the warrant is transferred by simply passing the warrant onto the new owner and 
there is no requirement to register the transfer with the company. However, in practice 
a warrant holder will probably want to notify the company of the new address to 
which correspondence and dividends should be sent. 
 
113. Clause 81 also gives effect to Schedule 4 which sets out the mechanism for 
converting existing share warrants into registered shares and provides for the 
cancellation of any share warrant that has not been surrendered or converted within 
nine months of the coming into force of the provision.  
 
114. Schedule 4 requires a company to give two notices to the warrant holder, (six 
months apart) informing them of their right to surrender and convert their warrant into 
registered shares and sets out the consequences of the failure to surrender the warrant. 
If the warrant is not surrendered by the end of the seventh month, voting rights, the 
right to receive dividends and other rights associated with the share warrant are 
suspended pending surrender. After the end of the surrender period the company must 
apply to court for the cancellation of the share warrant and serve notice of the 
application on the warrant holder. The notices to be given to the warrant holder and to 
the registrar contained in the Schedule are backed up by criminal sanctions.  
 
115. The application for cancellation must be accompanied by the nominal share 
value, any share premium paid and any dividend due to the warrant holder during the 
period of suspension. This is paid into court. Once the cancellation order is made, any 
further dividend due from the date of the application to the date of the cancellation 
order must also be paid into court. Following the making of the cancellation order a 
former warrant holder who failed to surrender a share warrant may apply to court 
within three years of the cancellation order for the sums paid into court to be paid to 
them. 
 
116. Clause 81 engages Article 6, Article 8 and Article 1, Protocol 1. 
 
117. Under Article 6 everyone charged with a criminal offence is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing. The criminal sanctions created in Schedule 4 can only be imposed 
by a court and there is a right of appeal built into the judicial system. Accordingly, the 
new criminal sanctions are Article 6 compliant. 
 
118. The requirement that share warrants are converted into registered shares 
engages Article 8 because the bearer of the share warrant will not be able to retain 
anonymity as a shareholder. Article 8 is a qualified right and can be interfered with in 
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the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country or for the prevention of crime. To the extent that this policy interferes with 
the right to a private life, the Government considers the requirement to convert share 
warrants into registered shares to be proportionate and necessary for the legitimate 
purpose of the prevention of crime and for the economic wellbeing of the country. 
The rationale for abolishing share warrants and converting existing share warrants 
into registered shares is to increase transparency in share ownership. This is required 
to prevent money laundering and evasion, avoidance or delay in the payment of taxes.  
 
119. The abolition and the cancellation of share warrants engages Article 1, 
Protocol 1 as the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions is interfered with. 
Article 1, Protocol 1 is a qualified right and can be interfered with where it is in the 
public interest to control the use of property or to secure the payment of taxes.  
 
120. The policy behind the abolition of share warrants is in the public interest to 
prevent crime by reducing the opportunities for money laundering and ensure taxes 
are paid. These clauses deal with existing share warrant holders. The intention is not 
to deprive warrant holders of their property but to require them to hold their shares in 
a transparent way by converting them into registered shares.  
 
121. To achieve this, companies will be required to give a number of notices to 
warrant holders about the need to convert the warrants or face cancellation and will 
need to apply to court for the cancellation of the share warrant. A cancellation order 
will not be made where the court is not satisfied that the notices were given. The 
mechanism for converting share warrants is backed up with criminal sanctions to 
encourage companies to follow the notification procedures.   
 
122. Where the warrant holder chooses not to exercise the right to surrender and 
convert into registered shares within seven months, the warrant holder’s shareholder 
rights will be suspended and eventually any warrant holder who chooses not to 
convert their share warrant into registered shares will be deprived of the warrant 
following a court order. This step is necessary to ensure that warrant holders surrender 
their warrants as quickly as possible. Without the ultimate sanction of cancellation, 
the warrant holders at whom the policy is directed would not apply to convert their 
warrants into registered shares.  
 
123. The long period of policy development, including public consultation and 
commitments, coupled with the strong notice requirements in the process, should 
reinforce the impact of the ultimate sanction of cancellation. Company stakeholders 
have confirmed that they can meet the timeframe for converting share warrants into 
registered shares. 
 
124. Where the warrant is cancelled the nominal value of the shares contained in 
the warrant and the payment of any outstanding dividend is required to be paid into 
court by the company. This will be used to compensate warrant holders who were 
unable, rather than unwilling, to surrender their warrant within the timeframe. They 
will be able to apply to court for the money paid into court by way of compensation. 
Compensation will be restricted to all but exceptional circumstances as part of the 
process of incentivising compliance of share conversion during the surrender period. 
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Compensation will protect vulnerable share warrant holders who were unable to 
convert their shares during the surrender period, for instance through illness.  
 
125. In some cases the nominal share value may be substantially less than the 
actual value of the share or shares if the warrant holder was to sell them.  This is 
consistent with the analogous position if a shareholder were to surrender their share to 
the company – they would only be entitled to its nominal share value.  Any 
assessment of market value would be costly and onerous and potentially spurious 
since these shares are not usually traded, the majority of warrants being issued in 
small private companies. Moreover, the company is required to fund the payment into 
court and if they were required to pay in the market value, this could adversely affect 
the value of the business or even the viability of the company to continue trading.  A 
balance has to be drawn between the company and its members holding registered 
shares on the one side and the individual who has chosen not surrendered the share 
warrant.  
 
126. Cancellation of share warrants involves a potential transfer of value to other 
members of the company. This is justified because of the policy aim of greater 
transparency and is fair as these members are prepared to hold their shares in a 
registered and transparent manner, whereas the warrant holder has elected not to do 
so. 
 
127. The interference is necessary. Transparency in share ownership is necessary to 
ensure that taxes are paid, that the purchase of shares cannot be used to enable money 
laundering, and that the UK complies with its international obligations to share 
information on share ownership.  The UK committed to action to tackle bearer shares 
in the UK’s G8 Action Plan at the Lough Erne Summit in June 20133.   
 
128. Following the reasoning in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and another v United 
Kingdom4  and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey5 the Government 
believes that the interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
strikes a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. There is 
a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
pursued. States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the 
means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement 
are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in 
question.  
 
129. The interference is a control of use, rather than a deprivation of possessions. 
The share warrant holder will be given plenty of notice and opportunity to avoid 
cancellation by converting the shares and there is compensation available in the 
3 The 2007 evaluation of the UK by the international “Financial Action Task Force” recommended the 
“UK [..] consider the justification and need for the on-going existence of bearer shares given the 
apparent lack of demand and potential risk of abuse.” The 2011 review of the UK system by the 
international “Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax” recommended the 
“UK should […] eliminate such [bearer] shares.” The UK committed to action to tackle bearer shares 
in the UK’s G8 Action Plan at the Lough Erne Summit in June 2013.   
4 [2007] 23 BHRC 405 
5 [2007] ECHR 40998/98 
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exceptional circumstances where the warrant holder is unable rather than unwilling to 
exercise the right of surrender. Cancellation without compensation only arises in the 
unlikely situation that a person chooses not to convert their share warrant into 
registered shares. 
 
130. The Government considers the abolition of share warrants to be proportionate 
and necessary for the legitimate purpose of encouraging transparency in transactions 
to prevent hiding the proceeds of crime, to secure the payment of taxes and to comply 
with international obligations and commitments. 
 
Corporate directors (clause 84) 
 
131. Clause 84 makes provision requiring company directors to be natural persons 
except in cases prescribed through secondary legislation.  
 
132. Legislation prohibiting legal persons from being company directors potentially 
engages Article 1, Protocol 1. The meaning of possessions under the European 
Convention on Human Rights is not limited to ownership of physical goods. It has 
been held to include for example goodwill in a business and licences and permits. 
Here the interference relates to the economic or commercial interest of the corporate 
director. The prohibition does not deprive natural persons who are directors of the 
corporate director from becoming directors in their own right. Any deemed 
interference would therefore amount to a control of the use of the economic or 
commercial interest of the corporate director.  
 
133. In Fredin v Sweden6 the ECHR held that the revocation of the applicant’s 
permit to exploit gravel on their property for commercial purposes, seemingly with no 
provision for compensation, did not amount to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1. In 
Van Marle v the Netherlands7, a case in which accountants were refused registration 
by their chartered institute following a change in the law, the court concluded that the 
interference was not disproportionate since there is a legitimate aim in regulating a 
profession and providing for registration by proving competence.   
 
134. The present prohibition aims to provide transparency and enhance trust in 
corporate structures. Corporate directors can obscure identification and liability of 
those who control companies, with the potential for criminal activity and poor 
corporate governance. Therefore restrictions on legal persons holding directorships 
are justified in the public interest. The clause allows the Secretary of State to make 
exceptions to the general prohibition. It is also still open to natural persons who are 
directors of an existing corporate director to become directors of the company of 
which the corporate director is currently a director. The restriction is therefore 
proportionate.  
 
Part 8: Company Filing Requirements 
 
Company registers (clause 91 and Schedule 5) 
 
6 (1991) 13 EHRR 784, ECtHR 
7 (1986) 8 EHRR 483, ECtHR 
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135. Clause 91 amends the Companies Act 2006 to provide private companies with 
the option to no longer keep and maintain certain private registers (register of 
members, register of directors and directors’ residential addresses, register of 
secretaries and the a register of persons of significant control). Where this option is 
exercised, the company will be required to provide to the registrar of companies all 
the information that would otherwise have been available on the private registers. 
With the exception of directors’ residential addresses, the registrar must record the 
information on the public register of companies and make it available for public 
inspection. 
 
136. Whilst most information in the private registers mirrors that already on the 
public register, some information such as a member’s address is not available on the 
public register. Where the option is exercised with respect to a register of members, 
members’ addresses will become more readily available and accessible through the 
public register. There is the risk this information may be abused, thereby potentially 
engaging Article 8. Interference with this right is, however, justified when it is the 
economic well-being of the country. The Government considers that the clause is 
justified and proportionate in this case because: 
 
(a) the new legislation is providing an option to the company (i.e. it is not 
mandatory) to exercise the option not to keep a private register; 
(b) there is already an existing provision allowing objections to an address being 
made available for public inspection under regulations made under section 
1088 Companies Act 2006; and 
(c) the option to no longer hold the register of members may only be exercised if 
there is assent by all the members (essentially providing any member a veto in 
the exercise of the option if they do not want their address to be made 
available on the public register). 
 
Registered Office disputes (clause 96) 
 
137. Clause 96 inserts a new section into the Companies Act 2006. The new section 
gives the Secretary of State a power to make regulations under which, following a 
successful application, the registrar of companies will be required to change the 
registered office address of a company, where the registrar is satisfied that the 
company is not authorised to use the current address.  
 
138. If the power is exercised, the registrar will have to make an administrative 
decision (arguably of “quasi-judicial” nature) determining whether a company is 
authorised to use an address as its registered office. In doing so, the process may 
engage Article 6. However, the company and any applicants will be entitled to appeal 
any decision of the registrar to the court. It is established that where an appeal to a 
judicial body is provided, there is no violation of Article 6, irrespective of whether the 
adjudicatory body in question does not comply with Article 68. This process allows an 
appeal on the facts. 
 
139. Consequently, the Government does not consider clause 96 to violate Article 6 
and any regulations made under the clause will similarly be compatible. 
8 Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) 5 EHRR v533, ECt HR, para 29 
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Director disputes (clause 99) 
 
140. Section 1095 of the Companies Act 2006 (and the regulations made under it)9 
provides a means of removing material from the public register by allowing specified 
persons to apply to the registrar to remove inaccurate information, or any information 
deriving from anything invalid or ineffective, from the register.  If any valid objection 
to an application is made, the registrar must reject the application. 
 
141. This clause amends section 1095 to provide a new procedure for removing 
material about company directors from the public register, replacing the current 
section 1095 mechanism in relation to any person appearing on the public register as a 
director who wishes to be removed.  The person, or someone acting on the person’s 
behalf, must apply to the registrar, stating that the person did not consent to act as a 
director.  If the company does not respond to the registrar within a specified 
timeframe stating, with the necessary evidence, that the person did consent to the 
appointment, the registrar will effect the removal.  
 
142. The clause potentially interferes with the Article 6 right to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Any decision-
making process by the registrar on whether a person is or is not a director would 
engage Article 6 as a determination of that person’s role as a director, and would 
therefore need to follow an Article 6 compliant process.  
 
143. The Government considers, however, that a decision to remove a person from 
the public register if the requisite proof is not provided would not constitute a judicial 
or quasi-judicial decision on whether or not they are in fact a director of the company 
since the public register is not determinative of whether a person is a director. Given 
the nature of the decision made under the new procedure, it is considered that no issue 
arises under Article 6, as there is no determination of civil rights. 
 
Strike off (clause 100) 
 
144. Clause 100 amends Chapter 1 of Part 31 of the Companies Act 2006. The 
clause reduces the period after which the registrar may strike off (remove) a company 
from the register of companies. The measures in the provisions will reduce the time 
from around 6 months to around 4 months.  
 
145. The lengthy time periods currently required to strike off companies are 
primarily in place to protect the companies themselves and the rights of creditors, by 
providing sufficient opportunity and notice to object to a proposed strike off. Without 
such protection, the right of creditors to enforce their debts may be jeopardised. 
 
146. Shortening the time period would increase this risk, and arguably engage 
Article 1 Protocol 1. However, the Government does not consider this right to be 
engaged, as  the reduced time periods are still sufficient for creditors, and the 
company themselves, to object to the striking off of a company).  In any event, if it 
were, any interference with the right would be proportionate and necessary as the 
9 The Registrar of Companies and Applications for Striking Off Regulations (SI 2009/1803), 
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reduction in the time period for strike off is in accordance with the general interest as 
it strikes a right balance between slimming down the number of companies on the 
company register and providing enough time for creditors or other persons to object. 
 
Part 9: Directors’ Disqualification etc 
 
Directors disqualification (clauses 101 to 113) 
 
147. Clauses 101 to 113 amend the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
(“CDDA”) (c.46), the Company Directors Disqualification (Northern Ireland) Order 
2002 and make consequential amendments to other enactments. The key changes can 
be summarised as: 
 
(a) introducing a new ground for disqualification of directors for conviction 
overseas of a serious offence relating to the management of a company; 
(b) introducing a new ground for disqualification of a person who causes a 
director to behave in an unfit manner; 
(c) removing the restriction on information to be used by the Secretary of State in 
determining whether to bring disqualification proceedings; 
(d) extending the time period within which an application for the making of a 
disqualification order may be made from 2 to 3 years; 
(e) increasing the factors to be taken into account by the court in determining 
disqualification applications; 
(f) requiring office-holders to submit a conduct report on directors to the 
Secretary of State in all cases of a company’s insolvency; and 
(g) expanding the provisions that automatically disqualify bankrupts from being 
directors across the UK. 
 
Article 6 
 
148. Directors disqualification legislation engages article 6(1) (right to a fair trial) 
as disqualification of an individual from being able to act as a director of a company 
is a determination of a person’s civil rights and there is a clear body of case law that 
states that action that restricts or grants the right to engage in a commercial activity or 
to practise a profession falls within Article 6(1)10. However the Government does not 
believe that any of the changes being made to the CDDA infringe the Article 6(1) 
right, because they do not affect the rights of individuals to have their disqualification 
proceedings heard in a fair and public trial. However three clauses raise specific 
Article 6(1) issues which are explored further below. 
 
149. Clause 101 allows a disqualification proceeding to be brought on the grounds 
that an individual has been convicted of a serious offence concerning the management 
of a company overseas. It could be argued that this infringes Article 6(1) rights since 
the overseas conviction might have not been made in compliance with Article 6(1) if 
in a country with a less open or impartial judicial system.  
 
150. However any risk consequent on this new ground for disqualification is 
mitigated by the fact that the court has discretion to disqualify, rather than being 
10 For example, Kingsley v UK 2002-IV; 35 EHRR 177 GC 
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obliged to disqualify an individual so convicted, and may take matters including the 
robustness of the overseas conviction and the standard of the relevant foreign judicial 
system into consideration when deciding whether to disqualify an individual. A 
further safeguard is provided by the requirement that the courts will only consider the 
matter on application by the Secretary of State, who must first decide that the 
disqualification of the individual would be in the public interest. In addition, the 
judgment to disqualify or decision to accept a disqualification undertaking are subject 
to appeal, and the Secretary of State’s decision to apply to the court or to accept an 
undertaking is subject to judicial review. These safeguards to the Article 6(1) right to 
due process results in such Article 6 rights being respected. 
 
151. Regarding clause 106, it is noted that the information passed from regulators 
might include information obtained under compulsion. This potentially engages the 
Article 6 right not to self-incriminate. However disqualification has been held to be a 
civil procedure, and as such the full extent of Article 6 ECHR (including the right not 
to self-incriminate) does not apply11. Following an ECHR decision in 199612, 
amendments to the CDDA were made that prevent information obtained in 
disqualification proceedings from being used in criminal proceedings (section 20(2) 
CDDA). The Government does not consider that Article 6 is engaged by clause 106. 
 
152. With respect to clause 105, the increase in the time period within which an 
application for disqualification proceedings against a director of an insolvent 
company may be brought from 2 to 3 years could arguably engage Article 6. Article 6 
guarantees that a right to a hearing within a “reasonable time”. However, the 
Government considers 3 years to constitute a reasonable time within which to initiate 
disqualification proceedings and so Article 6 is not engaged. 
 
Article 7  
 
153. Clause 101 creates a new ground for disqualification where an individual has 
been convicted of a serious offence concerning the management of a company 
overseas. While there is no intention to allow applications for disqualification of 
individuals convicted before this legislation comes into force, conduct leading to a 
criminal offence may have occurred before this legislation came into effect.  
 
154. Article 7 protects individuals from retroactive criminal offences and 
punishment. This retrospection may on the face of it engage Article 7, however it is 
the Government’s view that this is not the case. Article 7(1) explicitly limits the 
application of the Article to cases where an individual is held guilty of a criminal 
offence, and Article 7(2), which forbids ex post facto penalties, is limited to criminal 
penalties.  
 
155. As regards disqualification proceedings, there is case law that holds that 
disqualification proceedings are not ‘criminal’ in nature13. 
 
156. As to whether disqualification is a criminal penalty, prima facie it is not since 
it results from civil proceedings, rather than any criminal offence. In addition, the 
11 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Ex p. McCormick [1998] BCC 379 
12 Saunders v United Kingdom, (1996) ECHR 43/1994/490/572 
13 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Ex p. McCormick [1998] BCC 379 
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penalty, disqualification, is not punitive but preventative in nature, having as its main 
aim the protection of the public and the wider economy from the danger of potentially 
bad directors. Further, the nature and severity of the remedy does not render the 
proceedings offence “criminal” for the purposes of Article 7. Disqualification orders 
under clause 101 provide for a maximum period of 15 years. It is considered that the 
range of potential disqualification, given at the discretion of the court, means the 
penalty is not so high or severe to be considered criminal. 
 
Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1 
 
157. Disqualification proceedings in general engage Article 8 and Article 1, 
Protocol 1 as they may affect an individual’s ability in his private life to enjoy his 
property, in this case his profession. The changes to the disqualification regime 
contained in these provisions are likely to result in more directors being disqualified 
and are also likely to result in the disqualification of individuals who are not directors 
but cause a director to behave in an unfit manner. This is because the provisions 
introduce new grounds for disqualification and a more efficient regime. Consequently 
these additionally disqualified directors and other individuals will suffer interference 
with their Article 8 and Article 1, Protocol 1 rights.  
 
158. However, both Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1 rights are qualified and it is 
the view of the Government that any interference is justified as necessary for the 
economic well-being of the country due to the protection the public is afforded by 
disqualification of bad directors14 or those who cause directors to behave in an unfit 
manner. 
 
Compensation awards (clause 107) 
 
159. Clause 107 amends the CDDA to allow the Secretary of State to apply to the 
court for a compensation order or to accept an undertaking to pay compensation from 
a director who has been disqualified and whose behaviour has caused loss to one or 
more creditors of an insolvent company. The provision also allows for compensation 
awards to be sought from a person who is disqualified on the ground of having caused 
a director to behave in an unfit manner.  Legislation requiring compensation to be 
paid potentially engages Article 6 and Article 1, Protocol 1.  
 
Article 6 
 
160. This clause gives the ability to the Secretary of State to seek compensation 
from disqualified directors and other disqualified persons, either through a court or 
non-court route. Article 6 is engaged as the making of a compensation order or the 
agreement and acceptance of a compensation undertaking are likely to be a 
determination of a civil obligation under Article 6(1). The policy must therefore 
ensure that there is a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time to ensure that 
the Article 6(1) right is maintained. Where a compensation order is made by the court, 
there is a clear fair judicial process and article 6 rights are preserved. 
 
14 See for example Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297 
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161. The ability for the Secretary of State to accept a compensation undertaking 
removes the requirement that the determination for compensation is made in a public 
hearing. However the fact that the Secretary of State is able to accept an undertaking 
does not remove the ability for a director or other disqualified person to require the 
Secretary of State to apply to the court for a compensation order. As such, the director 
or other disqualified person can never be compelled to give a compensation 
undertaking and there is no removal of the director’s ability to request a public 
hearing.  
 
162. The inclusion of the right of review by an independent body (the court) is 
necessary to remove the possibility of contravening the Article 6(1) right to a fair 
trial, which might arguably be engaged by the same person (the Secretary of State) 
investigating, ‘judging’ and ‘sentencing’ a director in cases where a compensation 
undertaking is accepted. On review of the undertaking, the court may order the 
removal of the requirement to pay or reduce the amount of compensation due. No 
equivalent right of review is required where a court makes a compensation order as 
the usual routes of appeal and review of court orders will exist. It has been recognised 
by the ECtHR that the ability to appeal a decision to an independent court which 
complies with Article 6(1) and can examine the appropriateness and proportionality of 
the decision-maker’s actions is a sufficiently adequate safeguard for the purposes of 
Article 6.15 For this reason, Article 6 rights are respected. 
 
Article 1 Protocol 1 
 
163. The Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions is 
engaged as directors or other disqualified persons will have to pay compensation 
when subject to a compensation order or undertaking, which is clearly a deprivation 
of possessions. However this is a qualified right, with states able to enforce laws that 
can deprive an individual of his possessions or control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest.  
 
164. The possibility of a director having to pay compensation if disqualified 
establishes an incentive for directors to comply with their duties and legislation. This 
compliance is indisputably in the public interest. It is also in the public interest that 
creditors of a company that has become insolvent receive financial redress for their 
loss where possible, not only because of the benefit to the creditors but also because 
this additional protection for creditors will improve the conditions more generally for 
economic investment. As a result, the Government believes that the proposed 
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property has a legitimate aim. 
 
165. As to whether the policy of allowing compensation to be awarded is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim, the Government is of the view that it is. The 
compensation awarded cannot be more than the loss caused to creditors of the 
company, and any other financial redress already paid by the director must be taken 
into account by the court or Secretary of State in fixing the amount of compensation 
to be paid. The compensation is not punitive in nature. .  
 
Part 10: Insolvency 
15 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium 4 EHRR 1 para 51 PC. 
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Insolvency practitioner regulation (Clauses 134-143) 
166. Clauses 134 to 143 amend Part 13 of the Insolvency Act 1986, to strengthen 
the regulatory regime for insolvency practitioners. Among other changes, the 
amendments introduce a range of sanctions which the Secretary of State may use 
against a recognised professional body (an RPB) which fails to discharge its functions 
in a way which is compatible with specified regulatory objectives16. The clauses also 
allow the Secretary of State to apply to the court for sanctions against individual 
insolvency practitioners in certain circumstances. The provisions also contain a 
backstop power to revoke the recognition of all seven RPBs and to designate a single 
independent regulator in their place. 
 
167. There are currently seven RPBs. All are legal persons because they are bodies 
incorporated by Royal Charter17, or a body established by statute18 or are companies 
limited by guarantee19. In the Government’s view, they are not public authorities, 
which, the Government notes, cannot themselves be victims for the purposes of 
Article 34 of the Convention.20 RPBs are not governmental in nature. So may be 
recognised and supervised under a legal framework that they themselves do not 
exercise any governmental power, they are not publicly funded, they are not all 
established by statute and they are not democratically accountable. It is therefore 
likely that they are protected by the Convention. The ECHR provisions which may be 
engaged by these changes are considered below.  
 
Article 6 
 
168. The new regime includes the ability for the Secretary of State, having 
considered representations from the RPB, to issue directions, reprimands or fines 
against an RPB or to revoke its recognition if it fails to discharge its functions in a 
way which is compatible with the regulatory objectives.  
 
169. The Secretary of State’s decision whether to direct, reprimand or to revoke 
recognition of an RPB is a determination of the RPB’s civil rights and obligations, 
which engages Article 6 ECHR. It will be made following a quasi-judicial procedure 
16 The regulatory objectives are having a system of regulating persons acting as insolvency 
practitioners which delivers fair treatment for persons affected by their acts and omissions; reflects the 
principles under which regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, 
consistent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed, and any other principle which is 
considered to be best regulatory practice; encouraging an independent and competitive insolvency 
practitioner profession whose members deliver quality services transparently and with integrity; 
consider the interests of all creditors in any particular case, promoting the maximisation of the value of 
returns to creditors and also promptness in making those returns; and ensuring fees charged by 
insolvency practitioners represent value for money and protecting and promoting the public interest. 
17 The Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Scotland, the Association of Chartered Accountants, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Ireland, the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants and the Law Society of 
England and Wales. 
18 The Law Society of Scotland was established under the Legal Aid and Solicitors (Scotland) Act 
1949. 
19 The Insolvency Practitioners Association 
20 Rothenthurm Commune v Switzerland, App. No. 13252/87; and Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with 
Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37 
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designed to give the recognised professional body a fair hearing on the facts and any 
other basis on which the decision has been proposed.  
 
170. The Government accepts that when considering representations by an RPB, 
the Secretary of State will not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal for 
Article 6 purposes.  The Secretary of State is one of the parties to the dispute, and also 
part of the Executive21. It is nevertheless established that is the overall decision 
making process which must satisfy the requirements of Article 6. An administrative 
decision determining civil rights may be made by a body that is not sufficiently 
independent to satisfy Article 6, provided there is a subsequent appeal to a tribunal 
that has full jurisdiction to hear the case and provides the guarantees of Article 6(1)22.   
An RPB will be able to challenge a decision to direct it, reprimand it or to revoke its 
recognition to the court by way of judicial review. On the question of whether judicial 
review gives a court full jurisdiction, the ECtHR held that judicial review will be 
sufficient where administrative discretion comprising of specialist knowledge has 
been exercised if the initial decision on the merits is taken by an administrative body 
which follows a procedure which complies with Article 623.  In any event, traditional 
judicial review grounds do give the courts the flexibility to conduct a review of the 
evidence underpinning a decision as well as the legality of the decision if that is 
warranted in the circumstances of the case.24 The Government therefore considers that 
this, together with the procedure which the Secretary of State must follow to reach its 
initial decision meets the requirements of Article 6.  
 
171. RPBs will not have to rely on judicial review to challenge a financial penalty 
in relation to RPBs breach of a requirement. RPBs will be able to appeal a financial 
penalty to the court on certain statutory grounds, including that the requirement in 
question was complied with before the Secretary of State issued the RPB with notice 
of the penalty and that the amount of the financial penalty was unreasonable. It is the 
Government view that the statutory grounds are sufficiently broad to enable a body to 
challenge the facts and the law underlying the finding of liability against the body if 
that is appropriate, as well as the reasonableness of the decision and the amount of the 
penalty. The court, in being given the ability to substitute a financial penalty for a 
lesser amount and also to increase the time limit for the RPB to pay, will be able to 
award remedies which are more effective in this context than traditional judicial 
review remedies. 
 
172. The provisions allow the Secretary of State to apply to court for an order 
imposing a disciplinary sanction on an insolvency practitioner if it appears to the 
Secretary of State that the practitioner has breached professional standards and rules 
of professional conduct or an enactment whilst undertaking professional work and it is 
in the public interest that a sanction be imposed. There is no time limit in which the 
Secretary of State must make its application to ensure that a trial takes place within a 
reasonable time.  This potentially engages the Article 6 right to a hearing within a 
reasonable time. However the Secretary of State will only bring actions where it is in 
21 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium [1981] ECHR 3 in which it was held that a 
tribunal must be independent both of the parties before it and of the Executive. 
22 Schmauzer v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 511 and Ozturk v German (1984) 6 EHRR 409,   
23 Tsfayo v UK [2009]48 EHRR 18 
24 R (on the application of JB) v Dr Haddock and others [2006] EWCA Civ 961.  
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the public interest, which will result in actions brought within a reasonable time, i.e. 
when the issues that raised by the misconduct are still relevant.   
 
Article 1 Protocol 1 
 
173. The clauses make provision for the court to order the insolvency practitioner 
to pay a contribution which is equivalent to his fees or a proportion of his fees to one 
or more creditors of an insolvent estate where the creditors have suffered a loss as a 
result of the insolvency practitioner’s misconduct. This may be an interference of his 
or her right under Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. However the Government considers the interference to be justified in the 
public interest and proportionate. The court will only be able to order repayment of 
fees or a proportion of fees, if the practitioner’s misconduct has caused loss to 
creditors. Since insolvency practitioners’ expenses are paid in priority to the large 
majority of creditors, loss to an estate caused by insolvency practitioner misconduct is 
more likely to be felt by the creditors, than it is by the insolvency practitioner. The 
purpose of this policy is to increase the likelihood of returns to creditors, 
notwithstanding the mishandling of a debtor’s estate by the insolvency practitioner. At 
the same time it will deter future misconduct of the same type.  Both these outcomes 
will serve to benefit the economy as a whole. 
 
174. The exercise of a reserve power (clauses 141 to 143) to revoke the recognition 
of all seven RPBs and to designate a single regulator will potentially interfere with the 
RPBs’ Article 1 Protocol 1 rights.  The authorisation and regulation of insolvency 
practitioners forms a significant proportion, if not the entirety, of an RPB’s business. 
Once recognition is revoked or responsibility for the authorisation and regulation of 
insolvency practitioners is handed over to a single regulator, RPBs would no longer 
be able to continue with this part of their business.  The interference would, be 
justified in the public interest and proportionate. It will not come about unless there 
has been a review and consultation which concludes that the existing regulatory 
system, even with the improvements made to it in this Bill, is not achieving the 
regulatory objectives. The interference with the RPB’s rights will only be exercised if 
the creation of a single regulator is absolutely necessary to improve public confidence 
and consistency in the regime.   
 
Article 8 
 
175. Clause 139 introduces a power enabling the Secretary of State to investigate a 
suspected failure by an RPB to act compatibly with the regulatory objectives or a 
suspected breach by an insolvency practitioner of the rules which govern his practice 
and conduct in order to determine whether proceedings against a RPB or an 
insolvency practitioner should be commenced. The Secretary of State will be able 
require specified persons to provide such information as the Secretary of State may 
require for the exercise of his functions under Part 13 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and 
will be able to apply to court for a compliance order against a person who fails to 
comply. 
 
176. This provision engages Article 8 ECHR, since the collection and storage of 
information by officials of the state about an individual without his consent will 
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interfere with his right to respect for his private life.25 The Government considers that 
the interference will be justified because the information will be collected in 
accordance with the law, pursuant to a statutory power, in pursuit of a legitimate aim 
which would be to investigate a suspected failure by an RPB of the regulatory 
objectives or a suspected breach by an insolvency practitioner of the rules which 
govern his practice and conduct so that action may be taken where appropriate to 
remedy the breach. Personal and other sensitive data will not be collected with a view 
to sharing it with other agencies.  If it transpires that it is necessary to share personal 
and other sensitive data with the police or another regulator, the Government will do 
so in accordance with Article 8 ECHR, the Data Protection Act and the law of 
confidence. The ultimate benefit would be increased protection of consumers and 
creditors.   
 
Part 11: Employment 
 
Employment Tribunals 
 
Financial penalty for failure to pay Employment Tribunal awards, etc.  
(clause 145) 
 
177. The amendments to the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 in this clause create a 
new financial penalty regime to address non-payment of Employment Tribunal 
awards (including any costs awarded to allow a worker to recover Tribunal fees) and 
sums due under settlement agreements reached following the procedure in sections 18 
to 19A of the 1996 Act. The financial penalty provisions are intended to incentivise 
timely payments to workers and to level the playing field between, on the one hand, 
employers who take the Employment Tribunal process seriously, properly defending 
claims against them and dealing with the consequences and, on the other, employers 
who try to avoid paying compensation to workers.  
 
178. The penalties are not intended to be punitive and their level has been set with 
that in mind: half the sum owed to the worker with a minimum of £100 and a 
maximum of £5,000. In other words, the penalty will be proportionate, having regard 
to the sum owed. That there is no requirement for a finding of culpability or intent is 
also consistent with the penalties not being punitive in nature. 
 
179. The ECHR provisions that may be engaged are Article 6 and Article 1 
Protocol 1. Article 6(1) is relevant because the procedure for imposing financial 
penalties involves the determination of employers’ civil obligations. However, the 
procedure allows for a fair and public hearing to an appropriate court.  In addition, 
judgment will be “pronounced publicly”. This means that the requirements of Article 
6(1) are satisfied. 
 
180. The Government has considered whether Article 6(2) and (3), which require 
additional safeguards for those “charged with a criminal offence”, might be engaged. 
Case law has provided a three stage test to determine if a matter is a criminal offence 
for the purposes of Article 6. That test requires consideration of: 
25 X v UK No 9702/82 (Census data) 
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• the classification of the offence in the Member State; 
• the nature of the offence; 
• the possible punishment. 
The financial penalty regime here is not classified as criminal either by the 
clauses themselves or by application of the general law in England and Wales or 
Scotland so it remains for us to consider the nature of the “offence” in this case 
and the possible punishment. 
181. It could be argued that the main purpose of the new financial penalty regime is 
to exert pressure on employers to comply with their legal obligations and to punish 
breaches of those obligations. This has been held to be enough to engage the criminal 
provisions of Article 626. However, as discussed above, the primary policy reason for 
having financial penalties here is to support provisions about compensating workers 
that are clearly civil in nature. In particular, the penalties respond to a concern about 
the current low rate of compliance with Employment Tribunal orders having the effect 
of distorting competition. The relatively low level of the penalties has been fixed with 
that in mind. The Government therefore considers it unlikely that they would be 
considered to be criminal for the purposes of Article 6. 
 
182. Article 1 Protocol 1 is relevant because the financial penalties will amount to a 
deprivation of the possessions of natural or legal persons.  However, for the reasons 
given above this deprivation will be in the public interest. It will also be subject to 
conditions imposed by law. The Article itself makes clear that there is no objection in 
principle to penalties imposed by States. Therefore, the Government considers that 
there will be no breach of the right contained in Article 1 Protocol 1. 
 
Introducing criteria on the granting of postponements in Employment Tribunals 
(“ET”) (amendment to section 7 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996) and 
changes to cost rules in relation to late postponements of hearings in the ET 
(amendments to section 13 and 13A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996) 
(clause 146) 
 
183. The amendment to this section will provide that the power for making ET 
procedural regulations can include provision about postponement of hearings which 
limits the number of postponements available to a party in proceedings.  This will 
allow the ET to consider any previous relevant successful applications for 
postponement made by the applicant in the case.  
 
184. Policy intent is that the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure (“ET 
Rules”) will provide that if a party has already been granted a specified number of 
postponements in the same case then any further applications will only be granted in 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
185. The Government considers that there will be no ECHR issues with this 
approach, in particular with Article 6(1).   The rule will be subject to judicial 
discretion so that the ET can grant applications in exceptional circumstances.  
26 See e.g. Janosevic v. Sweden 2002-VII; 38 EHRR 473 paragraph 68 
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Moreover, the ET Rules made under these powers must be in accordance with the 
overriding objective27 of the ET Rules and ECHR compliant, and of course the ET 
exercising its discretion in this regard is also required to act compatibly with Article 
6(1) ECHR. 
 
186. The clause also amends sections 13 and 13A ETA to require that in the 
making of any regulations on costs (s.13) and time preparation orders (s. 13A) the 
Secretary of State must also make regulations to require the Tribunal to consider 
making a costs order where a party has made a late application for a postponement. 
 
187. The aim of these provisions is to require the Secretary of State to discourage 
unnecessary delay in Tribunal proceedings and reduce the occurrence of parties 
suffering financially as a result of behaviour which causes unnecessary delay. 
 
188. Again, the Government considers there will be no ECHR issues with the ET 
rules made under these duties, as the rules will enable judicial discretion to ensure the 
operation of the new postponement regime, and associated costs orders, are ECHR 
compliant.  
 
National Minimum Wage  
Penalties (clause 147)  
Civil and criminal penalties for NMW underpayment 
189. The Secretary of State has powers conferred by National Minimum Wage Act 
1998 (“NMWA”) to appoint officers to enforce the NMW.  At present HMRC 
enforcement officers carry out these duties.  There are two routes; civil enforcement 
through a notice of underpayment (NOU) issued in accordance with section 19A of 
the NMWA and powers under section 31 to prosecute criminal offences under the 
NMWA. Prosecutions are conducted by the CPS.  
 
190.  The NOU contains a fixed civil penalty calculated in accordance with section 
19A(4) to (7) of the NMWA.   Section 19B of the NMWA  ensures that an employer 
is not subject to a civil financial penalty and a criminal fine for refusing or wilfully 
neglecting to pay NMW in relation to the same incident.   
 
191. Currently, if an enforcement officer determines that the NMW has been 
underpaid he may issue a NOU to that employer; this notice will set out the amount of 
the underpayment and require the employer to pay a fixed penalty, in addition to the 
underpayment stated in the notice.  
 
192. The employer has a right of appeal against the penalty to an employment 
tribunal (ET) under section 19C of the NMWA.  The employer can appeal against the 
decision to serve the NOU, the requirement in the NOU to pay an amount to a worker 
or the requirement in the NOU to pay a penalty.   
27 Rule 2 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure in Schedule 1 of The Employment 
Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2012 
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193. At present HMRC prepare the evidence to support a NOU on the basis that 
HMRC would be able to prove on the balance of probabilities the underpayment 
identified in the NOU before an ET if an employer were to appeal under section 19C.  
Whilst the NMWA does not place the burden of proof on either HMRC or the 
employer in any such appeal, the evidence which HMRC will rely on will be that 
which supported the decision to issue the NOU and so will normally be sufficient for 
HMRC to be able to prove its case. 
 
The penalty is calculated as a percentage of the amount of arrears owed by the 
employer, as specified in the NOU. The percentage is specified in section 19A(4) and 
may be modified by secondary legislation. The maximum and minimum levels of the 
penalty are set down in section 19A(6) and (7) and may also be modified by 
secondary legislation. The powers to set these limits are contained in section 19A(8) 
of the NMWA.  In March 2014, the maximum limit was raised to £20,000 from 
£5,000 and the percentage was increased from 50% to 100% by the National 
Minimum Wage (Variation of Financial Penalty) Regulations.  
 
194.  Clause 147 amends section 19A so that the maximum penalty is £20,000 per 
worker, as regards the arrears owed under a NOU. (The current maximum is £20,000 
per NOU, however many workers the arrears may relate to.).  This means that there 
will be no overall limit to the maximum penalty, as at present.    It will remain the 
case that an enforcement officer will not have discretion as to whether to impose a 
penalty, as was the case when this penalty was first introduced. The Secretary of State 
will continue to have powers (as at present) to direct that a NOU should not be served 
in specified circumstances.   
 
Article 6 
195. There are arguments that penalties in excess of £20,000 may be considered 
criminal penalties for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, and that there are not sufficient 
safeguards for employers to satisfy the criminal procedural requirements of Article 6. 
However, the Government considers that the penalties under these provisions are not 
criminal in nature and that, in any event, there are sufficient safeguards to meet the 
requirements of Article 6.  
 
196. Article 6 provides procedural guarantees in cases which determine a person’s 
civil right and obligations.  These guarantees also apply to a person subject to a 
criminal charge.  In addition there is a higher level of safeguards guaranteed under 
article 6(2) and (3) which apply only to those subject to a criminal charge.  Whether a 
penalty is civil or criminal for ECHR purposes is determined by (a) the categorisation 
of the allegation in domestic law, (b) the nature of the offence and (c) the severity of 
the penalty28. 
 
197. The penalty which is imposed under section 19A of the NMWA is 
characterised as civil, but it is arguable whether the nature of the offence is civil or 
criminal.  There is no requirement for culpability which would suggest that it is civil 
but it has a deterrent and punitive nature which would support a conclusion that it is 
28 Engel v Netherlands (No 1) (1976) 1 EHHR 647 
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criminal in nature.  The criteria are not cumulative but where they are finely balanced 
they can be considered cumulatively.  When this approach is adopted, the higher the 
level of penalty, the greater the severity and the more likely that the penalty is 
criminal for ECHR purposes.   
 
198. However, even if the penalty could be categorised as criminal for ECHR 
purposes it is compatible with article 6(2)  ECHR (which requires that everyone 
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty in 
accordance with the law)  if HMRC assume the burden of proof in any appeal under 
section 19C.  In such circumstances, whilst the NOU would continue to be imposed 
without HMRC having proved its case, the requirements of article 6(2) would be met 
if the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities applied at the appeal stage.  
199. The Government considers that on balance, whilst there is a risk of a court 
concluding that a financial cap of £20,000 per worker would mean that the regime is 
to be considered criminal in nature for ECHR purposes, the better view is that the 
regime remains civil in character. 
 
200.  This is in part because the level of the penalty would prevent the employer 
from benefiting from the money saved through the underpayment and to that extent it 
was not punitive.  In addition, there is no need to establish culpability (which again 
favours the conclusion that it is a civil penalty) and there is no public finding of guilt 
which occurs with a criminal offence. The revised NMW Naming scheme which 
came into effect on 1 October 2013 made it easier for the Secretary of State to name 
employers that break National Minimum Wage law and to this extent there is some 
public finding of guilt for employers who do not comply with the NMW, albeit not 
through a court process. 
 
Compatibility 
 
201. Based on this view, the Government considers that the introduction of a power 
to set the maximum fine by reference to the amount of arrears owed to each worker 
with no overall limit on the amount of penalty which can be imposed through one 
NOU does not result in the penalty which can be imposed under section 19A of the 
NMWA becoming criminal for ECHR purposes.  As a result, the Government 
considers that the procedures for the imposition of that penalty and for an appeal 
against it are compatible with article 6(1) ECHR and article 6(2) and (3) have no 
application. 
   
202. However, if the penalty were criminal for ECHR purposes, the Government 
considers that HMRC enforcement procedure is compliant with the requirements of 
article 6(2) and (3) ECHR (that is the procedural protections which exist for those 
subject to a criminal charge). In particular, when imposing penalties under section 
19A, HMRC accept that the burden of proof to establish failure to pay the NMW falls 
on HMRC. 
 
Staff exit payments in the public sector 
 
Power to make regulations in connection with public sector exit payments (clause 
149) 
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203. Clause 149 confers a power upon the Treasury to make regulations that 
introduce provisions which allow public sector bodies to recover some or all of an exit 
payment from a worker who returns to work in the public sector before a defined 
period. Further details of this power are contained in clause 150. 
 
204. Other general powers enables the regulations to include different provision for 
different purposes, general and specific provision, exceptions, incidental, 
supplementary, consequential, and transitional measures (including amendments to 
any legislation).  
 
205. The payment recovery provisions are subject to any waivers made by the 
Secretary of State under clause 151. That clause also provides the Treasury with a 
power to direct how any waivers are made by the Secretary of State under the clause, 
or require the Treasury consent to waivers. Clause 151 is not considered separately, as 
the effect of that waiver on human rights in inextricably intertwined with the power in 
clause 149.   
 
Article 1 Protocol 1 
 
206. Article 1 Protocol 1 provides that every natural or legal person is entitled to 
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, and that no-one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law.  Deprivation of possessions or 
interference with their peaceful enjoyment may be justified if they: 
 
(a) are subject to conditions provided for by law;  
(b) are for a legitimate aim in the general interest; and  
(c) strike a fair balance between the rights of the owner of possessions and the 
public interest: in striking a fair balance any interference with the right must 
be reasonable and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  
 
207. The Government recognises that where a public sector worker had received an 
exit payment, that payment is likely to be considered their property within the 
meaning of Article 1 Protocol 1, and those property rights are affected by the 
imposition of payment recovery provisions. 
 
208. However, the Government considers that in any event any interference with 
Article 1 Protocol 1 rights will be lawful and proportionate. The general principles 
applied by the Courts in deciding whether interference with possessions is lawful 
are29:  
(a) The principle of lawfulness presupposes that the applicable provisions of 
domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise, and foreseeable in their 
application. No viable challenge can arise on this basis. Primary and secondary 
legislation will clearly set out the provisions which may give rise to 
interference with Convention rights. These are likely to have been widely 
publicised and will be consulted upon before they are made.  
 
29 Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2006) 42 EHRR 15 and (2007) 45 EHRR 4 
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(b) The principle of a legitimate aim presupposes the existence of a general 
interest in the community which is inherent in the need for a fair balance. 
Reform to staff exit payments across the public sector is, generally, a 
legitimate aim for the government. In 2011-12, the public sector paid out £2.7 
billion in payments to workers leaving the public sector. These payments are 
unlocking very substantial reductions in staff costs in the medium to longer 
term and so playing a crucial role in meeting the challenge of reducing the 
fiscal deficit. For the worker who receives them, they provide a financial 
bridge into new employment or retirement. But there also needs to be 
reassurance that these kinds of payments are fair, fulfil their correct purpose, 
and represent good value for money. Potential inefficiencies in existing exit 
payment systems have been highlighted by cases where workers who have 
received large payments and quickly returned to public sector roles.  The 
Government notes that the purpose of an exit payment is to provide the worker 
who leaves employment or office with a financial bridge to new employment 
or into retirement. However, when the worker returns to work in the public 
sector, the exit payment does not fulfil that purpose, but instead enriches the 
worker at the taxpayer’s expense. The Government accordingly considers that 
it is fair and proportionate for such a worker to repay some or all of the exit 
payment that is not required for its original purpose.  
 
(c) The principle of fair balance requires an investigation to ascertain whether any 
person bears a disproportionate and excessive burden, and whether in turn this 
has been fairly balanced with the legitimate aim. This clause does generally 
constitute a fair balance between the interests of workers in the public sector 
who leave work, and fairness to the taxpayer who underwrites the payments 
made upon exit. It enables steps to be taken to ensure that such payments are 
value for money and used for a proper purpose. It also enables general and 
specific exceptions and waivers to be made in cases where this would not be 
appropriate (including situations where the operation of the payment recovery 
provisions would be a disproportionate interference with Article 1 Protocol 1 
rights).  
 
209. This macro-economic judgement has been recognised by the Courts as the 
preserve of Government policy which should not be interfered with short of manifest 
unfairness or impropriety, which the clause does not constitute. For example, the case 
of Stec stated “a wide margin is usually allowed to the State under the Convention 
when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy” and “Because of 
their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in 
principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public 
interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the 
legislature’s policy choice unless it is “manifestly without reasonable foundation”.”30   
 
210.  Although the judgement in Stec is of broad application, the issue before the 
Court in that case (and in previous cases31) related to Article 1 Protocol 1 in relation 
to social security benefits provided by the state (including state pensions). The 
Government acknowledges that staff exit payments are likely to be treated as part of 
30 Stec v UK (2006) 43 EHRR 1017, paragraph 52 
31 Muller v Austria (1975) 3 DR 25 and Stec, ibid 
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remuneration and in that respect are distinct from social security benefits32. However, 
the Government contends that a similar margin of appreciation will exist in this case, 
by analogy, given that: 
 
 
(a) The Court in JA Pye33 extended the same wide margin of appreciation to 
legislation covering rights to private property, stating “The Court, finding it 
natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in 
implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect 
the legislature’s judgement as to what is in the public interest unless the 
judgement is manifestly without foundation.” 
 
(b) Remuneration of public servants is both a macro-economic policy under the 
Government’s direct control and a matter of Government spending, given that 
staff exit payments are, in the main, funded from general taxation and are in 
any case underwritten by funds from general taxation.  
 
211. The Government recognises that the position may be slightly different for staff 
exit exercises that are underway at the point where bodies reform their schemes 
(either on or before April 2016), or at the point where bodies are brought within the 
scope of the reform after April 2016. The clause benefits from a general power to 
make transitional provision so that these staff exit exercises can be allowed to 
continue under their original terms. As such, there will be no interference with these 
Article 1 Protocol 1 rights.  
 
Article 14 
 
212. Article 14 provides that Convention rights shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, ethnic origin, age, national or social 
origin, or any other status. This is an illustrative and not an exhaustive list34. Article 
14 does not provide a free-standing right but only applies when another Convention 
right is engaged – in this case, Article 1 Protocol 1. A breach of Article 14 does not 
presuppose that the linked Article is breached35.  Discrimination occurs when a public 
authority, for no objective or reasonable reason: 
 
(a) treats a person less favorably than others in similar situations on the basis of a 
particular characteristic;  
 
(b) fails to treat people differently when they are in significantly different 
situations; or  
 
(c) applies apparently neutral policies in a way that has a disproportionate impact 
on individuals or groups. 
  
213. Discriminatory law or treatment is lawful where there is a reasonable 
justification for the measures imposed. This will require a legitimate aim and there is 
32 Barber v GRE [1990] ICR 616  
33 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. UK [2005] ECHR 921, paragraph 44 
34 Engel v Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 
35 Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305 
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a reasonable relationship of proportionality between that aim and the measures 
applied.  The Government enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in assessing whether 
and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different 
treatment in law. The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the 
circumstances, the subject-matter and its background36. The level of justification 
required will also vary depending upon which ground is affected, and will be higher 
in the case of discrimination on grounds such as race, sex, nationality, religion or 
sexual orientation. 
 
214. The Government does not accept that the power in this clause, when used, will 
generally amount to discrimination. The payment recovery provisions will operate in 
the same way regardless of the gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age, or other relevant 
characteristics of the public sector worker. The payment recovery provisions will be 
created to achieve the legitimate aims discussed above. The payment recovery 
provisions will be tapered so that the amount of money repaid is calculated according 
to the value of the payment and the time spent outside of the public sector. That will 
ensure that only that part of the exit payment which does not fulfill its original 
purpose – to act as a financial bridge into further employment – will be repaid. And 
there is the ability to create general and specific exceptions and waivers to be made in 
appropriate cases (including situations where the operation of the payment recovery 
provisions would be unlawful discrimination within the meaning of Article 14).  
 
Human Rights Act 1998 
 
215. In any event, when this power is exercised by the Treasury, it will of course be 
required by section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to act in a manner that is 
compliant with the ECHR. 
 
 
CONSIDERATION OF THE SMALL BUSINESS, ENTERPRISE AND 
EMPLOYMENT BILL PROVISIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
 
216. In preparing for the Bill, in addition to giving consideration to the 
compatibility of provisions in the Bill with the ECHR, the Government has 
considered the Bill provisions in light of those rights set out in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).  
 
Part 5: Childcare and Schools (Clauses 71 to 74 and Schedule 2). 
217. These provisions have been considered in light of the most relevant rights set 
out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
218. The provisions contain amendments to Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006 which 
regulates childcare in England. The provisions reduce the age for which schools have 
to register separately with Ofsted from three year olds to two year olds, give 
childminders more flexibility in the premises from which they operate by allowing 
them to also provide care on non-domestic premises and allow other providers to 
36 Rasmussen v Denmark A 87 (1984) 7 EHRR 371 
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register once in respect of more than one set of premises rather than requiring separate 
registrations for each premises.    
219. It is anticipated that the provisions will reduce bureaucracy and make it easier 
for schools and other providers to offer more flexible child-care services for children 
of working parents and in doing so the Government is mindful of Article 18(3) 
requiring States to take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of working 
parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they 
are eligible.   
220. The Government has had regard to Article 3(1) – that the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration and Article 3(3) - that State Parties shall ensure 
that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of 
children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities. In 
operating out of more than one set of premises providers will still be required to 
notify, and obtain the approval of, the Chief Inspector (or a childminder agency for 
providers registered with agencies) to ascertain the suitability of the premises for 
providing childcare. Existing provisions in relation to inspections, suspension or 
cancellation of registration and protection of children in an emergency will continue 
to apply so that the interests of children are protected.   
221. In addition the government has been mindful of Article 29 (goals of education) 
and Articles 31 (leisure, play and culture) in making it easier for schools to take two 
year olds. The measure is not about requiring two year olds to sit at school all day. It 
is about improving the affordability and quality of childcare, including the educational 
element. Providers, including schools, are already required to deliver the Early Years 
Foundation Stage Framework (EYFS) which comprises a mix of welfare and learning 
and development requirements. The EYFS recognises the importance of learning and 
developing through play and for providers to consider the individual needs of each 
child and this will continue to be the case. The Government is satisfied that these 
provisions comply with the UNCRC.   
 
Part 7: Companies (transparency)  
Register of persons with significant control (Clause 78 and Schedule 3) 
 
222. As discussed above, clause 78 introduces a new Part into the Companies Act 
2006 that requires companies to identify and obtain information on people with 
significant control over the company (“PSCs”).  
 
223. The definition of a PSC covers any person who can be said to control or 
exercise influence over a company. This includes every shareholder who owns more 
than 25% of the shareholding of a company. Since there is no restriction on a child 
being a shareholder, where a child is the legal owner of more than 25% of the shares 
of a company that child will be a PSC. A child may also be a PSC through other 
forms of control, although this is unlikely. 
 
224. The result of the child being a PSC is that information about the child will be 
made available both on a register kept by the company and on the public register kept 
by the registrar of companies. This information includes name, date of birth, service 
and residential address (although the residential address will not be available for 
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public inspection), nationality, usual country of residence and details about the form 
of control the PSC has in relation to the company.  
 
225. On the face of it, this potentially engages article 16 of the UNCRC, which 
guarantees that “no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his or her privacy”. However the Government is of the view that while there is clearly 
an effect on the child’s right to privacy, any interference is proportionate and 
necessary in accordance with the law, so neither arbitrary nor unlawful. The policy 
intention behind the implementation of the PSC register is to make transparent the 
ownership of companies, reducing the possibility to use companies for criminal 
purposes, and ultimately benefiting the economic well-being of the country. 
 
226. Further, there are appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate any risks to the 
child of the information being available. There are two protection regimes built into 
the provisions providing different levels of data suppression where there is a 
recognised risk of violence or serious intimidation to a PSC caused by being on the 
PSC register.  
 
BIS 
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